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When an individual suffers personal injuries that ulti-
mately result in death, two separate legal actions are available.
Initially, the victim may seek compensation for his or her per-
sonal injuries.' Later, if the victim dies because of those inju-
ries, the decedent's survivors may institute a wrongful death
action.2 Until recently, while both of these actions were theo-
retically possible, only the wrongful death action was actually
taken to final judgment. Double litigation seldom occurred
because the victim rarely survived long enough to obtain a
final personal injury judgment. Therefore, neither claim pre-
clusion nor issue preclusion barred the wrongful death benefi-
ciaries' cause of action,' and no equitable concerns over double
recovery arose.
Recent advances in medical care, however, have "exacer-
bated a deficiency in the law."14 Because life support technolo-
gies can substantially prolong survival, it is increasingly
possible for a personal injury action to reach final judgment
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1. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RIcHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 201-72
(1988). A personal injury plaintiff may frequently seek compensation for medical
expenses, lost earnings and impairment of earning capacity, as well as for pain,
suffering, and other intangibles. Id.
2. Id. at 273-75. A cause of action accrues upon death where that death results
from a defendant's tortious conduct. Id.
3. See infra notes 44-48, 53-60 and accompanying text.
4. See Maureen Chesson, TORTS-Wrongful Death-Actions for Wrongful Death
Not Extinguished by Decedent's Personal Injury Recovery-Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99,
432 A.2d 857 (1981), 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 371, 378 (1982).
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before death occurs.5 If the victim dies as a result of life sup-
port withdrawal, complex legal and ethical dilemmas arise in
the survivors' wrongful death action because two judgments
are rendered and, therefore, two awards may accrue to
survivors.
The drafters of the earliest wrongful death acts could not
foresee this double litigation scenario, or the bearing that med-
ical developments would have upon it, when the first statutes
were created in the mid-nineteenth century.6 These acts, now
incorporated in the statutes of all states, sought to create
recovery for a decedent's survivors to compensate them for the
very real injuries that they might sustain from the loss of a
relative.7
This Comment examines the legal and equitable dilemmas
that arise in such circumstances and proposes various solu-
tions. Section II examines both the history of wrongful death
actions and modern applications of law. This historical over-
view reveals that most courts reject the doctrinal bases of
wrongful death actions.8 Specifically, when one has recovered
on behalf of a decedent for fatal injuries, these courts tend to
construe wrongful death statutes in a manner that denies stat-
utory beneficiaries of a cause of action. Such preclusion is
driven by the following policy concerns: finality of judgments,9
perceived windfalls to wrongful death beneficiaries,' and ill-
motivated decisions made by those beneficiaries to withdraw
life support, thereby creating a death upon which to sue."
To the extent that problems of finality and overcompensa-
tion are real, this Comment asserts that the remedy does not
lie in misconstruing wrongful death acts so as to deny benefi-
ciaries all recovery. Rather, the answer lies in fashioning dam-
ages rules that avoid overcompensation without precluding
recovery altogether. Alternative damages rules can also mini-
mize the risk that beneficiaries will prematurely withdraw life
5. See infra notes 14, 15.
6. See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 127, at 945-46 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
7. STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:9, at 29 (2d ed. 1975).
8. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 955-56; SPEISER, supra note 7,
§ 5:20, at 631; see also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9. JACK FRIEDENTRAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1, at 607 (1985). See infra
note 29 and accompanying text.
10. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 955.
11. See Suber v. Ohio Medical Prods., Inc., No. C14-90-00069-CV, 1991 Tex. App.
LEXIS 144 (1991), withdrawn, 811 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Houston 1991, writ denied).
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support in order to create a death upon which to sue or to pre-
serve to the decedent's estate the prior personal injury award.
To the extent that new damages rules fail to eliminate this
risk, additional safeguards can guide surrogate medical deci-
sion-making and the use of living wills. Accordingly, these
solutions would enable courts to construe wrongful death stat-
utes in a manner consistent with the doctrines that produced
them, while preventing excessive recoveries.
Section III sets forth the case of Suber v. Ohio Medical
Products, Inc.,12 which illustrates the problems and conflicts
inherent in the prevailing statutory construction. Suber
involved a wrongful death action brought by survivors of a per-
manently comatose victim who obtained a final award on inju-
ries from which she later died. Section IV discusses policy
issues and proposes solutions to determine whether survivors'
actions should accrue. In particular, this section focuses on
periodic payment systems as an answer to the most serious
problems raised in these instances of double litigation. Finally,
Section V applies the proposed solutions to the Suber line of
cases.
II. HISTORY AND MODERN APPLICATIONS OF LAW
Prior to developments in modern life support techniques,
an injured victim would often die before commencing a per-
sonal injury action or bringing it to final judgment. Even
when such an action was commenced, death would often follow
soon enough to permit a wrongful death action brought by the
victim's survivors to be joined to the decedent's pending per-
sonal injury action.
13
Modern medical developments now permit a victim to sur-
vive beyond final litigation, 4 notwithstanding the two- to five-
12. Id.
13. See Chesson, supra note 4, at 388-99; PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at
943 (under a few survival statutes, an action does not survive if death follows from the
tort; rather, only a wrongful death action is permitted).
14. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (patient
persisted nearly seven years in a vegetative state); In re Estate of Greenspan, 558
N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990) (patient maintained on life support for at least five years); see
generally W.F.M. Arts et al., Unexpected Improvement After Prolonged Posttraumatic
Vegetative State, 48 JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, AND PSYCHIATRY 1300
(1985); Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs,
Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or Withhold Life Support,
263 JAMA 426 (1990); Kenichiro Higashi et al., Five-Year Follow.Up Study of Patients
with Persistent Vegetative State, 44 JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY, AND
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year time frames of many personal injury actions.'" These
developments pose new dilemmas in the context of personal
injury litigation--dilemmas that will likely bear increasingly
on the application of wrongful death acts.
A. Doctrinal Bases of Wrongful Death Actions
To understand what recovery a decedent's survivors might
reasonably seek as wrongful death beneficiaries, it is important
to evaluate the legal doctrines that produced this cause of
action and to view what recovery was historically available to
injured victims themselves. Distinguishing between recovery
available to victims, as opposed to their survivors, clarifies both
historical trends and modern applications of law. Importantly,
an historical overview aids in the evaluation of modern courts'
fidelity to the doctrinal foundations of wrongful death actions
in the context of prior adjudication.
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, certain restrictive
rules applied where a victim died from tortiously-inflicted inju-
ries. First, a victim's right to sue for his or her injuries died
with either the tortfeasor or the unfortunate victim. 16 This
harsh rule has been replaced in virtually all states by acts
known generally as "survival statutes," which permit the vic-
tim's cause of action to survive his or her death.'7
A second harsh rule that existed prior to the mid-1800s
PSYCHIATRY 552, 552-54 (1981); David E. Levy et al., Predicting Outcome from
Hypoxic-Ischemic Coma, 253 JAMA 1420 (1985).
15. See Benjamin R. Civiletti, Zeroing In on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational
Justice, Needless Delays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REv. 40 (1986); Steven Flanders,
Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984); Kirk B.
Johnson et al., The American Medical Association/Specialty Society Tort Reforn
Proposal A Fault-Based Administrative System, 1 Courts, Health Science & The Law 7
(1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in
Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475 (1991); Teresa M. Schwartz,
The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1121 (1988).
16. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 125A, at 940.
17. Id. §§ 125, 126, at 941-42. It is important to note that a survival action is not a
new cause of action, but a means of permitting an already available cause of action to
be brought, or an already initiated suit to be concluded, notwithstanding the original
plaintiff's death. Id. § 126, at 942. For example, under a typical state survival statute,
a personal injury suit commenced by or on behalf of a victim prior to death transfers
(in his or her name) to the decedent's personal representative. Because this survival
action is the continuation of a suit, the same defenses apply and damages are restricted
to those the victim could have sought had he or she survived. Id. § 126, at 943. Typical
recovery includes lost wages, medical expenses prior to death, and pain and suffering.
Id.; HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra note 1, at 274.
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denied survivors and dependents of an independent cause of
action, despite the fact that they might have suffered severe
financial and emotional loss as a result of the victim's death.'"
No independent recovery existed to compensate these "secon-
dary" victims of a defendant's illegal conduct. 9 Rather, at
common law "the death of a human being could not be com-
plained of as an injury."20 Thus, prior to the creation of sur-
vival and wrongful death actions, it was "cheaper for the
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him."'"
In England, a remedy for a victim's relatives appeared in
1846 with Lord Campbell's Act,22 the progenitor of wrongful
death statutes now adopted in the United States and in Can-
ada. Entitled "[a]n act for compensating the families of per-
sons killed by accidents, '23 this act provided as follows:
[Whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by
wrongful Act, Neglect or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or
Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have
entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover
Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the
Person who would have been liable if Death had not ensued
shall be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding
the Death of the Person injured.24
Lord Campbell's Act, therefore, created a new and independ-
ent cause of action limited to certain beneficiaries and measur-
ing damages by their loss as opposed to that of the deceased
victim. 25 This act represents the first legal recognition of the
very real injuries experienced by survivors-and of their
independent right of recovery-where a tortfeasor's conduct
leads to a loved one's death.
B. Construction of Wrongful Death Statutes
Nearly all state wrongful death statutes incorporate the
very wording of Lord Campbell's Act or language that provides
18. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 945; SPEISER, supra note 7, § 1:1,
at 2.
19. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 945.
20. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033, 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
21. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 942.
22. 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See SPEISER, supra note 7, § 1:8, at 28.
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for essentially the same basis of liability.26 Yet, in applying
that language, the majority of courts largely undermine the
principles that originally gave rise to wrongful death actions.
Those principles addressed the compensation of a victim's sur-
viving relatives for very real injuries sustained by them,
independent of those injuries sustained by the decedent.
1. Majority Rule
When a deceased victim has litigated a prior personal
injury suit to final judgment, courts in the majority of jurisdic-
tions construe wrongful death acts in a manner that withholds
compensation from survivors.' Despite the fact that wrongful
death acts confer on surviving beneficiaries the independent
right to recover, under the majority rule, survivors may sue
only if the decedent herself could actually have done so at the
time of death.'
The majority rule rests in part on the policy concern for
finality of judgments: a cause of action merges into a (personal
injury) judgment, and once that judgment is final, no cause of
action remains.' The denial of recovery to surviving benefi-
ciaries turns on judicial construction of the "derivative" lan-
guage of wrongful death statutes; that is, the extent to which
the right to sue in wrongful death derives from the decedent's
right to sue for personal injuries at the time of death."0
Seeking to deny survivors a cause of action where the vic-
tim has already litigated personal injuries, courts following the
majority rule interpret Lord Campbell's Act as placing survi-
vors in the shoes of the decedent. Thus, a final judgment in
the prior personal injury suit precludes recovery in wrongful
26. Id. § 2:1, at 61-62.
27. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579, rehg denied, 415 U.S. 986
(1974); Rumo v. Celotex Corp. (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 726 F. Supp.
426, 432-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010 (Fla.
1983); Hall v. Knudsen, 535 A.2d 772 (R.I. 1988); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6,
§ 127, at 946, 954-56; SPEISER, supra note 7, § 5:20, at 631; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 92.1 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1976); Vitants M. Gulbis, Annotation,
Judgment in Favor of, or Adverse to, Person Injured As Barring Action For His Death,
26 A.L.R. 4th 1264 (1991). See, e.g., Delesma v. City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th
Cir. 1985); Rimer v. Safecare Health Corp., 591 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1991); Wilson v.
Whittaker, 154 S.E.2d 124 (Va. 1967).
28. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 579-80; SPEISER, supra note 7, § 5:20, at 631.
29. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.1, at 607; Donovan Flora, Periodic
Payment of Judgments in Washington, 22 GONZAGA L. REV. 155, 155 (1986/1987).
30. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 955.
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death.3 By this reasoning, any substantive or procedural bar
to the decedent's ability to litigate a cause of action, but for
death, likewise prevents survivors from bringing a wrongful
death suit.32
2. Minority Rule
The minority rule,3 in contrast to the above approach, is
more true to the compensatory principles upon which wrong-
ful death actions are based. Under this rule, it is the tortious
nature of a defendant's injurious conduct that determines
whether a wrongful death action will stand, independent of the
victim's legal situation at death 4 Therefore, survivors are per-
mitted to sue for wrongful death if the defendant's conduct is
negligent; the derivative language of Lord Campbell's Act
would preclude suits only where a defendant's conduct affords
no substantive basis of liability.'
Granting survivors a cause of action in wrongful death
31. This arguably follows from a plain reading of the Act's critical clause,
incorporated into most states' wrongful death statutes, which confers upon survivors a
cause of action when a "wrongful Act ... is such as would (if Death had not ensued)
have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages in respect
thereof .... Id. at 954 (quoting Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846))
(emphasis added).
32. Thus, in Suber, the court reasoned that "a wrongful death claim derives
wholly from the cause of action that the decedent could have asserted for personal
injuries had he lived .... The survivors thus occupy the decedent's legal shoes." 811
S.W.2d at 649 (citing Delesma v. City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1935)).
Because res judicata would have barred a subsequent action by the decedent (for
example, for unforeseen complications arising from injuries already sued on) by virtue
of her final judgment, the survivors could not maintain an action for her wrongful
death.
33. See Alfone v. Sarno, 432 A.2d 857, 861 (N.J. 1981); PROSSER AND KEETON,
supra note 6, § 127, at 956. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, reh'g
denied, 415 U.S. 986 (1974); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1969);
James v. Samaritan Health Servs., Inc., 744 P.2d 695 (Ariz. 1987).
34. Alfone, 432 A.2d at 861. By this rationale, the focus is on the "wrongful [aict
. . . such as would have entitled the [p]arty injured to maintain an [a]ction and
recover." PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 954 (quoting Lord Campbell's
Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93 (1846)) (emphasis added).
35. Adopting this view, Prosser observes that:
It is not at all clear . . . that such provisions of the death acts ever were
intended to prevent recovery where the deceased once had a cause of action,
but it has terminated before his death. The more reasonable interpretation
would seem to be that they are directed at the necessity of some original tort
on the part of the defendant, under circumstances giving rise to liability in the
first instance, rather than to subsequent changes in the situation affecting
only the interest of the decedent.
DEAN WILLIAM PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 911 (4th ed. 1971).
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despite a final personal injury judgment resolves the inherent
illogic of the majority rule, because where (as under that rule)
wrongful death beneficiaries stand in the shoes of the
decendent, a wrongful death suit amounts to nothing more
than a survival action.' The two causes of action, however,
were created to address distinct victims, distinct injuries, and
distinct liabilities based on the same tortious conduct.
The minority rationale was adopted in the case of AZfone
v. Sarno.s The Alfone court held that the statutory language
of New Jersey's wrongful death act referred only to the tor-
tious nature of a defendant's conduct, thus removing obstacles
to survivors' cause of action.' Observing that the majority of
jurisdictions "have allowed [the concern for double recovery]
... to confound the statutory rights of wrongful death benefi-
ciaries as to wipe them out completely,"'  the court proceeded
to tailor recovery, awarding only for those injuries sustained
by survivors that were not compensated for as part of the dece-
dent's prior personal injury award.4° This tailoring, in turn,
alleviated the concern over double compensation so often
expressed in majority rulings.
The United States Supreme Court has indicated support
for the minority rationale, albeit in an admiralty case. In Sea-
Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,41 the Court upheld wrongful
death recovery under the Death on the High Seas Act,'
notwithstanding a prior personal injury award, applying the
relevant statute in accordance with the "independent" inter-
36. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 575 n.2; Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 654-55 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
37. 432 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1981). In Alfone, a surgery patient suffered permanent
injuries and recovered damages for temporary and permanent physical injury; past,
present and future pain and suffering-, and medical expenses projected over her
estimated survival of 44 years. Id. at 859. The victim died during the appeals process,
and a wrongful death action was instituted just prior to the expiration of the statute of
limitations period. Id. at 859 n.2. The state appellate division reversed the trial court's
decision to uphold the defendant's motion for summary judgment, submitted on
grounds that the survivor's cause of action was barred by the victim's prior final
judgment. Id. at 859-60.
38. Id. at 863; Chesson, supra note 4, at 379.
39. Alfone, 432 A.2d at 866.
40. Id. at 867-68.
41. 414 U.S. 573, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
42. Id. at 577-83. The Court reinforced the concept of a true wrongful death
remedy "founded upon the death itself and independent of any action the decedent
may have had for his own personal injuries." Id. at 578 (referring to Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970)). The Court went on to observe that "[b]ecause the
respondent's suit involves a different cause of action, it is not precluded by res
judicata." Id.
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pretation of the derivative language of Lord Campbell's Act.
The majority was not deterred by alleged risks of excessive or
overlapping recovery.43
The Alfone and Sea-Land decisions recognize the distinct
injuries that wrongdoers potentially inflict on distinct victims
and, in adhering to the minority rule, these decisions uphold
both the doctrinal bases of wrongful death acts and the equita-
ble interests of statutory beneficiaries.
C. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel Reconciled in the
Context of Prior Adjudication
Disputes over a cause of action's scope present crucial
threshold battles that influence the outcome of litigation." In
resolving such disputes, both majority and minority advocates
invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in
the context of wrongful death actions initiated after final per-
sonal injury judgments are rendered.45
43. Id. at 583-84.
As to the availability of damages, the majority held that an injured
longshoreman's recovery for future wages, medical expenses, and pain and suffering
did not preclude his widow's suit on his death. Id. at 591. The Court reasoned as
follows:
Obviously, the decedent's recovery did not include damages for the
dependents' loss of services or of society, and funeral expenses. Indeed, these
losses-unique to the decedent's dependents--could not accrue until the
decedent's death. Thus, recovery of damages for these losses in the maritime
wrongful-death action will not subject [the defendant] to double liability or
provide the dependents with a windfall.
Id. at 591-92.
Sea-Land reversed the lower court with respect to damages sought under general
maritime law and those authorized by federal statutes. Except as applied to longshore-
men and territorial waters, Sea-Land's holding permitting recovery for loss of society
has been subsequently reversed in wrongful death actions arising under the Death on
the High Seas Act. Mobil Oil v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). In all other
respects (that is, in cases involving coastal waters and to which the Death on the High
Seas Act is inapplicable), Sea-Land continues to uphold a general maritime cause of
action in wrongful death subsequent to final personal injury actions.
44. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.2, at 620; SPEISER, supra note 7, § 5:19,
at 629.
45. See, e.g., Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 578-92 (minority rule); Delesma v. City of
Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338 (5th Cir. 1985) (majority rule); Semler v. Psychiatric
Institute of Washington, D.C., 575 F.2d 922, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (consistent with the
majority rule, Virginia law permits a wrongful death action only when predicated on
the non-availability of a survival action); Rumo v. The Celotex Corp. (In re Joint E.
and S. District Asbestos Litigation), 726 F. Supp. 426, 432-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (majority
rule); Rimer v. Safecare Health Corp., 591 So. 2d 232, 233-35 (Fla. 1991) (majority rule);
Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Fla. 1983) (majority rule);
Alfone v. Sarno, 432 A.2d 857, 865-67 (N.J. 1981) (minority rule); Hall v. Knudsen, 535
A.2d 772 (R.I. 1988) (majority rule); Brown v. Rahman, 282 Cal. Rptr 815 (Cal. App.
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1. Res Judicata
To advocate the minority position, it is necessary to recon-
cile the doctrine of res judicata in the context of prior litiga-
tion. This is because the doctrine is frequently cited under the
majority approach as a reason for withholding recovery from
wrongful death beneficiaries where the decedent has already
recovered for personal injuries."
The doctrine of res judicata prevents a plaintiff from
bringing any claim that has been or could have been decided in
prior litigation; the fact of judgment forecloses later actions.47
The rule is based on the following two policies: "first,... no
person should be twice vexed by the same claim; and second,
... it is in the interest of the state that there be an end to liti-
gation."' 4 The target of any application of res judicata is the
measure of precisely what was litigated or what could have
been litigated in a prior lawsuit. Thus, it is necessary to char-
acterize exactly what constitutes the "claim" or basic unit of
litigation.49
Res judicata should apply in the context of prior adjudica-
tion to protect a defendant from answering more than once for
a single wrong. But to reason that only one wrong is commit-
ted in this situation (i.e., that a single transaction gives rise to
only one claim) requires, as the majority of courts conclude,'
1991), rev. denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (Cal. 1991) (majority rule); Suber v. Ohio
Medical Prods., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 646, 652-53 (Tex. App.-Houston 1991, writ denied)
(majority rule).
46. Cf. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.1, at 607; Flora, supra note 29, at
155.
47. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.2, at 612.
48. Id. § 14.3, at 615. See also Chesson, supra note 4, at 387, and Flora, supra note
29, at 155, which illustrate the majority rule application of this principle in the context
of prior adjudication.
49. In some states, the "claim" to which res judicata applies includes all recovery,
on any ground, that a plaintiff could seek as against a defendant for injuries arising out
of a single event, transaction, or occurrence. Friedenthal discusses this broadened
modern definition of the unit of litigation to which res judicata applies; such a concept
arguably promotes the purposes of res judicata by facilitating resolution in a single
lawsuit of "all legal questions that may arise from the same transaction or occurrence"
so that "the whole controversy between the parties may . . . be brought before the
same court in the same action." FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.4 n.7, at 621.
This broad definition encompasses what other courts consider to be the narrower
"cause of action" target of res judicata or the legally cognizable basis of recovery (e.g.,
personal injuries, defamation, contract, fraud) on which a plaintiff sues. See id. § 14.1,
at 607. Compare Pittman v. LaFontaine, 756 F. Supp. 834, 841-42 (D.N.J. 1991).
50. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 579, reh g denied, 415 U.S. 986
(1974); SPEISER, supra note 7, § 5:22, at 631.
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that the wrongful death beneficiaries' claim or cause of action
derive wholly from that of the injured victim.
The minority position resolves issues of res judicata by
viewing a defendant's conduct in these circumstances as consti-
tuting a single transaction or occurrence, yet one that gives rise
to two independent claims.5' One claim encompasses all rights
that the injured victim may potentially invoke against the
defendant for his or her injuries. The other claim derives
directly from the same tortious conduct and encompasses all
causes of action that survivors may bring against the same
defendant for independent injuries that they suffer from a rel-
ative's death.52 This position rests on the rationale that the
respective suits involve different, and differently situated,
plaintiffs. For purposes of res judicata, therefore, a final judg-
ment as to one suit is not a final judgment as to the other,
notwithstanding the fact that both suits target the same
defendant.
2. Collateral Estoppel
While res judicata addresses some or all claims arising
from a transaction, the doctrine of collateral estoppel addresses
individual issues.53 Collateral estoppel protects against the risk
of duplicative compensation, a policy concern often cited under
the majority approach.'
As previously described,s" the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel was applied by the United States Supreme Court in Sea-
Land to satisfy the compensatory purposes of the wrongful
death statute while characterizing damages already awarded
and eliminating those damages from subsequent recovery.56
51. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 946. See also Sea-Land, 414 U.S.
at 577-78.
52. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, at 941. Accord Brown v. Rahman, 282
Cal. Rptr. 815, 816-18 (Cal. App. 1991), rev. denied, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4252 (Cal. 1991).
53. For example, this doctrine precludes relitigation of an issue of fact or of
liability where the issue has been fully litigated in an adversarial context and where
the parties in the respective suits are in privity (i.e., are situtated and share interests
such that one party's interests effectively represent those of the other). FRIEDENTHAL
ET AL., supra note 9, § 14.2, at 613. Compare Pittman v. LaFontaine, 456 F. Supp. 834,
841-42 (D.N.J. 1991).
54. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 6, § 127, at 955. See Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at
583-84; Rumo v. Celotex Corp. (In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 726 F. Supp.
426, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1012
(Fla. 1983).
55. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
56. Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 591-92.
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Thus, in that case, previous recovery by the injured victim for
permanent disability, physical agony, and loss of earnings did
not preclude his wife's recovery on his death for loss of society
and funeral expenses. The previous judgment did, however,
prevent recovery of financial support to the extent that the
issue of compensation for future earnings was fully litigated in
the prior proceeding.57
Thus, the concern under the majority approach regarding
double recovery is misplaced in view of (1) distinctions
between wrongful death and personal injury actions and (2)
the doctrinal foundations of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. Double recovery can be avoided, at least in part, by direct
applications of collateral estoppel. Even in majority rule juris-
dictions, courts have held that, considering distinctions
between parties and damages in survival actions (victims'
actions) as opposed to those in wrongful death suits (brought
by survivors), neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel pre-
clude recovery under one cause of action on grounds of a judg-
ment in the other.' Therefore, neither res judicata nor
collateral estoppel supports denying a cause of action to wrong-
ful death beneficiaries where a decedent's personal injury suit
has reached final judgment.
D. Statute of Limitations Issues
Timing dilemmas that arise from wrongful death statutes
of limitation demonstrate the inappropriateness of the major-
ity statutory construction in the context of prior adjudication.
This is especially true where life support systems prolong sur-
vival for periods of years, making it more likely that either the
victim's action will be concluded by the time of death, or that
the statute of limitation on a personal injury action will expire
prior to death. As one dissenting judge has forcefully noted,
where a wrongful death beneficiary's action is seen as being
wholly derivative of the decedent's right to sue at the time of
death, it is possible for a wrongful death action to expire under
the relevant statute of limitation even before it accrues.59
In virtually all jurisdictions, a wrongful death action
57. Id. at 592-93.
58. Suber v. Ohio Medical Prods., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.-Houston
1991, writ denied).
59. Id. at 655 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
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accrues at death.' Yet, to tie survivors' rights to sue to the
decedent's rights at the time of death creates a conflict when
the decedent fails to file a personal injury suit and when the
statute of limitation has expired by the time of death with
respect to any causes of action on which the decedent could
have sued. In these circumstances, a decedent dies without a
cause of action; thus, under the majority rule, the surviving
beneficiaries' cause of action is precluded even before the vic-
tim dies.
Only the minority construction of the derivative language
in wrongful death statutes resolves this conflict. Thus, a
wrongful death beneficiary's right to sue should be viewed as
directly rooted in the tortious nature of the defendant's con-
duct and independent of the deceased victim's right to sue at
the time of death. In contrast, the majority construction raises
and perpetuates statute of limitation dilemmas and, in doing
so, violates the doctrinal bases of wrongful death actions by
denying recovery to survivors who have suffered real injuries.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: SUBER V. OHIO MEDICAL PRODUCTS
A recent case that illustrates the legal and equitable
dilemmas posed by this double litigation scenario is Suber v.
Ohio Medical Products, Inc.61 In 1985, while undergoing minor
surgery, Christy Suber suffered an overdose of anesthetic gases
that produced permanent physical and mental injury and ren-
dered her comatose.6 2 While she was still alive, her husband
instituted a personal injury suit on her behalf against Ohio
Medical Products (the maker of the anesthetic apparatus), a
hospital physician, and the hospital.6 3
A jury found Ohio Medical negligent and awarded the vic-
tim over $6,000,000. 4 Approximately $5,000,000 of this lump
60. SPEISER, supra note 7, § 11:10, at 184; see generally id. §§ 11:9, 11:15, at 183-192.
61. 811 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Houston 1991, writ denied).
62. Ohio Medical Prods., Inc. v. Suber, 758 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
(final appeal in personal injury accident) [hereinafter Ohio Medical Prods.]; Gary
Taylor, Wrongful Death Case Presents Novel Issue; Texas' Court Weighs Whether
Once Is Enough, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991, at 3.
63. Ohio Medical Prods., 758 S.W.2d at 871. Following dismissal of charges
pertaining to the hospital and physician, the case proceeded against only Ohio Medical
Prods., Inc. Id.
64. The damages awarded compensated the decedent and her husband for past and
future medical expenses, past and future mental and physical impairment, loss of
decedent's future earnings, past and future loss of consortium, and past and future loss
of decedent's services. Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 652.
1993]
724 University of Puget Sound Law Review
sum award was allocated to future medical expenses based on
projections of Ms. Suber's expected survival.' The judgment
was affirmed by the Texas State Court of Appeals on Septem-
ber 15, 1988.1
Ms. Suber died on February 1, 1989, following her family's
decision on January 12, 1989, to withdraw nutrition and hydra-
tion.67 A wrongful death action was then filed in a Texas dis-
trict court by the decedent's mother and husband on their own
behalf, and also on behalf of Ms. Suber's two minor children,
against the same defendants sued in the prior personal injury
action."
All defendants moved for summary judgment contending
that the suit was barred by res judicata, satisfaction and
release, and the language of the Texas Wrongful Death Act.69
The trial court granted these motions, holding that the wrong-
ful death action was barred because the decedent, having
recovered on a final judgment in the prior action, could not
have sued for additional damages arising from her original
injuries had she survived. 0 Thus, viewing these beneficiaries
as standing in the procedural shoes of the decedent, the wrong-
ful death action was precluded because a subsequent personal
injury suit would have been precluded.
In accordance with the minority rule, the Texas Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that under a proper reading of the
wrongful death act it is the tortious nature of a defendant's
action that confers a right of recovery on survivors and not
merely the absence of procedural obstacles to a victim's right
to sue had she survived.71 The court summarized the issue in
65. Suber v. Ohio Medical Prods., Inc., No. C14-90-00069-CV, 1991 Tex. Ct. App.
LEXIS 144, at *20 (1991), withdrawn, 811 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied);
Taylor, supra note 62, at 3.
66. Ohio Medical Prods., 758 S.W.2d 870.
67. Suber, 1991 Tex. Ct. App. LEXIS 144, at *20.
68. Id. Damages sought pursuant to the state's wrongful death statute included
damages for mental anguish, loss of society and companionship, pecuniary loss or loss
of support, and loss of inheritance. Id. at *8-9; Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 652.
69. Suber, 1991 Tex. Ct. App. LEXIS 144, at *2-5; Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 648. Texas'
original wrongful death statute adopted the very language of Lord Campbell's Act. In
the current statute, the language is modernized and provides that beneficiaries may
sue in wrongful death "only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring
an action for the injury if he had lived." TEX. PRAc. REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(a)
(Vernon 1986).
70. Suber, 1991 Tex. Ct. App. LEXIS 144, at *1, 15-17; Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 648.




the case as follows: "[whether] the death, in fact, was caused
by the wrongful act or omission of the defendant . . .is the
vital inquiry in each case. The statute imposes no other condi-
tion upon the right to sue. [Courts have] no authority to
impose an additional or different one.' '7 2 Res judicata did not
bar the beneficiaries' action because different plaintiffs initi-
ated the later action and because these survivors sought differ-
ent damages than those awarded in the prior personal injury
suit.7 3 Collateral estoppel, however, applied to preclude recov-
ery of damages to the extent that the same damages were
awarded in the prior suit.74
This Texas Court of Appeals ruling was withdrawn on
rehearing by the same court sitting en banc.75 The trial court
judgment was reinstated and recovery was precluded alto-
gether. The final appellate opinion followed the majority rule,
in that the survivors' rights were foreclosed by procedural bars
to the decedent's own right to recover but for her death. Thus,
in construing the derivative language of the Texas Wrongful
Death Act, the court's reasoning focused on the victim's situa-
tion as opposed to the nature of the defendant's conduct.
Judge Pressler concluded in this decision that res judicata
barred the wrongful death action because the defendant's con-
duct gave rise to only one cause of action on which either the
victim herself or, alternatively, her survivors, could sue.7"
The final Suber opinion revealed Judge Pressler's concern
over excessive and duplicative recovery. 77 Possibly, this con-
cern was expressed in order to reinforce the court's construc-
tion of the state wrongful death act and its consequent
preclusion of a survivor's cause of action. Moreover, this ruling
72. Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 655 (citing Louisville, Evansville, and St. Louis R.R. Co. v.
Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1894)) (Ellis, J., dissenting).
73. Suber, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 144, at *10.
74. Id. at *11, 14.
75. Suber, 811 S.W.2d 646.
76. Specifically, the court observed that "[t]he language [of the act] renders it
practically certain that the purpose of the Legislature was to furnish a remedy for the
injury caused by the death to those dependent upon the deceased, by giving them an
action in lieu of that which he might have maintained but did not assert, but not to
provide double recovery for one wrong." Id. at 649 (quoting Thompson v. Fort Worth
and R.G. Ry. Co., 80 S.W. 990, 992 (1904)) (emphasis added). However, acknowledging
that the wrongful death action involved different plaintiffs and damages issues than
the already concluded personal injury action, Judge Pressler observed that "[a]part
from this statutory language [by which survivors are seen as occupying the legal
position of the decedent] ... res judicata is inapplicable to the instant case." Id. at 652.
77. Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 651.
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was consistent with, and arguably driven by, concern that a
second large award would flow to the decedent's survivors
through her estate.7"
In the original appeal, Judge Pressler had reasoned that
recovery in a double litigation situation "could affect a family's
decision as to whether to discontinue life-support measures."79
Specifically, in the first wrongful death proceeding, Judge
Pressler emphasized that the largest portion of the personal
injury award, $5,000,000, was allocated to future medical
costs.80 He noted the survivors' possible motivation to with-
draw life support in order to reserve this large lump sum
award to themselves by way of the decedent's estate."'
While acknowledging that statutory beneficiaries are often
the same individuals appointed to make life support with-
drawal decisions, and even conceding their possible motivations
to withdraw support in order to create a death upon which to
sue, the decision by the Suber court to deny wrongful death
recovery fails to entirely protect against survivors' ill motives.
Motivations may continue to underlie decisions to withdraw
life support in order to preserve personal injury awards. Fur-
ther, if, as under the majority rule, beneficiaries' recovery
derives wholly from the rights that the decedent had at death,
premature life support withdrawal may result from a "race"
against the statute of limitation applicable to the personal
injury claim that the decedent could have brought but perhaps
did not assert.
The latest ruling in this case illustrates current policy con-
cerns and dilemmas that wrongful death actions raise when
brought in the wake of concluded personal injury suits. Argua-
bly, it is the concern for excessive recovery and for the risk of
inappropriate life support withdrawal, rather than the doctri-
nal principles underlying wrongful death statutes, that drives
78. Suber, 1991 Tex. Ct. App. LEXIS 144, at *20 (Pressler, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In this regard, Judge Pressler stated as follows:
Now the bulk of this award will go to the decedent's estate because, at the
family's request, feeding and hydration were discontinued on January 12, 1989
and Christy Suber died on February 1, 1989. Having recovered substantial
damages for future medical costs, appellants had financial incentive to request
the discontinuation of life-support measures. The majority's holding increases
the incentive to discontinue life-support by allowing the statutory
beneficiaries to seek further damages under the wrongful death statute.
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courts in the majority of jurisdictions to interpret these acts in
a manner that denies any recovery for statutory beneficiaries.
IV. POLICY CONCERNS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Overcompensation of Statutory Beneficiaries
Considering the doctrinal conflicts inherent in the major-
ity construction of wrongful death statutes, it is possible that
the majority rule is driven not by fidelity to the underlying
principles of wrongful death and survival actions, nor by con-
cerns for duplicative recovery, but rather by fears of windfalls
to statutory beneficiaries. This concern is arguably best
resolved by legislatures, not by courts. However, until the
problem is legislatively addressed, existing judicial principles
can be employed to avoid inequitable results. Collateral estop-
pel, for example, minimizes perceived risks of excessive recov-
eries by isolating damages in wrongful death suits from those
already litigated in personal injury actions.8 2 Special jury ver-
dicts8 3 also represent a valuable procedural solution for tailor-
ing recovery and avoiding overcompensation."
Concern for excessive compensation has intensified despite
the fact that wrongful death statutes were created to provide
recovery for different injuries and to different plaintiffs than
those involved in personal injury or survival actions85 Courts
appear. reluctant to uphold suits where statutory beneficiaries
stand to accede to both a wrongful death judgment and,
through the decedent's estate, to the decedent's prior personal
injury award.86 In order to limit survivors' recovery, courts
arguably misconstrue wrongful death statutes on the ground
that the survivors have recovered enough.8 7 The result is ineq-
uitable because it completely bars recovery by survivors for
identifiable pecuniary and emotional injuries they have suf-
fered independent of injuries suffered by the decedent.8 8
82. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591-92, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 986
(1974); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9.
83. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
84. See Alfone v. Sarno, 432 A.2d 857, 867 (N.J. 1981): "As was said earlier, the
wrongful death statute was intended to create a separate cause of action in favor of the
next of kin and accordingly was designed to provide specific elements of damages
tailored to fit their needs."
85. Id. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
86. See Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 656 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. See Alfone, 432 A.2d at 867-68 (noting funeral expenses, lost support by way of
decedent's lost earnings, and lost parental advice and guidance). In light of such
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Double recovery issues in wrongful death actions that fol-
low final personal injury judgments can be resolved through
the use of special jury verdicts that itemize damages.8 9
Through special verdicts, collateral estoppel more effectively
prevents recovery by beneficiaries of damages already recov-
ered by the decedent in the prior suit (for example, the vic-
tim's lost future earnings). This requires that proof of damages
offered in prior suits be examined in subsequent wrongful
death proceedings. Where a personal injury case raises the
likelihood of a future wrongful death suit (as in the Suber and
Alfone cases), special verdicts should be employed.'
Criticisms remain, however, concerning juries' practical
abilities to make these speculative estimations, and concerning
the potential unfairness in requiring juries to tailor recovery so
narrowly.9' As discussed below, however, segregating damages
is arguably no more speculative than the process of arriving at
a lump sum figure.92 Also, considering the problems obviated
by itemizing damages, making additional demands on juries is
justified.93
On balance, judicial concern for excessive recovery is
arguably resolved through procedural mechanisms of special
verdicts and collateral estoppel. Tailoring recovery should
encourage courts to apply wrongful death statutes with respect
to the equitable purposes of these acts. This, in turn, should
also encourage courts to acknowledge what, in these circum-
inequities the court in Alfone stated the following: "Considerations of fairness toward
the survivors, who have suffered a loss at the hands of a wrongdoer, and the desire to
fulfill the beneficent purposes of the wrongful death statute impel us to temper the
severity of our general rule with an exception." Id.
89. In contrast to the general verdict, by which the jury finds for either party
without disclosing the grounds for its decision, the special verdict is rendered in
response to factual questions submitted to the jury. The court then applies the law to
these findings. The primary advantages of special verdicts include efficiency, clarity
(by which the basis for a decision is determined, thereby facilitating review on appeal
of a portion of a verdict), and elimination of the need for jury instructions. Special
verdicts accompanied the advent of apportionment rules in tort actions requiring
relative fault or specific damages estimation. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 9,
§ 12.1, at 530-36; FED. R. Cirv. P. 49(a); BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1399 (5th. ed. 1979).
90. Chesson, supra note 4, at 391.
91. Id. ("Speculation in the area of damages recoverable in an action involving
injury to a human being is inevitably compounded by successive actions.") See infra
notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
93. For discussion of the burdens and practical problems posed by juries' tailoring
damages in this way, see infra notes 114, 115 and accompanying text.
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stances, are proper boundaries between legislative and judicial
functions.
Any decision to systematically and entirely preclude recov-
ery in circumstances such as those in Suber is best left to legis-
latures.94 Representative legislatures conferred the original
right of recovery upon survivors. Thus, any consensus that
recovery in cases such as Suber produces unjustified windfalls
to beneficiaries should similarly emerge from legislatures and
not from courts, as should any effort to alter the objectives of
wrongful death legislation.
B. Structured Settlements and Periodic Payments
To the extent that concern for overcompensation of
wrongful death beneficiaries is justified, deferred payment
mechanims represent another solution. Under structured set-
tlements and periodic payment systems, recipients are compen-
sated over time rather than by a single lump sum award. In
other words, the injured claimant receives as his or her award
a promise from some entity to make future payments accord-
ing to an agreed-upon schedule.95
94. Civiletti, supra note 15, at 44.
95. Two deferred payment mechanisms, periodic payments systems and structured
settlements, represent a part of an overall movement toward tort reform. See Flora,
supra note 29, at 171. Both were developed in response to states' interests in
controlling medical costs by reducing malpractice insurance premiums, which are
directly affected by lump sum personal injury awards. These plans vary, but generally
include immediate cash payment for past and current expenses and other immediate
needs, including attorney fees. DANIEL W. HINDERT ET. AL., STRUCTURED
SETTLEMENTS AND PERIODIC PAYMENT JUDGMENTS § 1.01, at 1-2, 1-3 (1989).
A deferred payment plan may provide for future damages in the form of (1)
regular flat payments over one's lifetime, (2) periodic payment increases, (3) provisions
for continuation of payments to decedent's estate for a specified time or termination of
payments at death, (4) provisions for lump sum payments at specified dates, (5)
payments for a fixed period of years, (6) provisions addressing specific anticipated
expenses, (7) provisions for lump sum payment at the plaintiff's death, and (8)
provisions for medical trusts. Id. § 1.01(2), at 1-3. See also MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT
OF JUDGMENTS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 141 (1990), which provides for termination of medical
expense payments at death.
Apart from certain distinctions, the terms "periodic payments" and "structured
settlements" are often used interchangeably. Two major features of structured
settlements are (I) their individualized nature, which allows parties to determine the
terms, amounts, and frequency of payments, and (2) the fact that they are voluntary
and provide for judicial recourse for purposes of an alternative lump sum award.
Flora, supra note 29, at 157-58. Periodic payments, as opposed to structured
settlements, apply to judgments as well as to settlements and do not mandate
annuities (utilized frequently in structured settlements). HINDERT ET AL., supra
§ 1.01(3), at 1-5.
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As part of a movement for tort reform, many state statutes
now provide for mandatory or elective periodic payment of
economic damages in personal injury suits and other actions.
To date, at least thirty-one states have enacted legislation pro-
viding for periodic payment awards. 6 Most statutes address
only medical malpractice or personal injury cases. 7  The
majority of these states (approximately two-thirds) now make
periodic payment schedules mandatory, either above a statu-
tory threshold award (usually $100,000 to $250,000) or on
motion by an interested party or the state. The remaining
states provide for court discretion in instituting periodic pay-
ment awards.98
Periodic payment plans resolve concerns for overcompen-
sation of survivors. This is especially true where such plans
are used to administer decedents' personal injury awards, and
where they permit the award of certain economic damages
only as those damages are incurred (subject to the limit of an
otherwise immediate lump sum award, or until death occurs). 9
Such provisions often apply to future medical costs incurred
over an injured person's convalescence or projected survival. 1°°
This approach eliminates the risk that survivors will inappro-
priately accede to personal injury awards through a decedent's
96. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-543 (1987), 6-11-3 (1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.040(d),
09.55.548 (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-208 (Michie 1992); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§§ 667.7, 697.320 (Deering 1991); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-64-201 to 204 (1991); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225d (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 768.78(1), 768.78(2) (West Supp. 1992.) HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-24 (1988);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1602 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1705 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-2-2.1 to 2.4 (West 1990); IOWA CODE § 668.3(7) (1987);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3407 to 3411 (1990) (held unconstitutional by Kansas Supreme
Court, Victims v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988)); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.2004
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5114 (West 1991),
§§ 40:1299.39, 40:1299.4 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2951 (West
1990); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1991); MICH. COMp. LAws § 600.6309
(1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.25 (West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.220 (Vernon
1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-403 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-7 (Michie 1992);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 5031, 5041 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-09
(Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.06 (Anderson 1992) (at court's discretion,
party may request trier of fact to make a separate finding with respect to continuing
custodial care), §§ 2323.56, .57 (Anderson 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-21-12 (1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 38-79-480 (Law Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3A-6 (Supp.
1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-25, 78-14-9.5 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-424 (Michie
1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.260 (1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 655.015 (West Supp. 1992).
See HINDERT ET AL., supra note 95, Appendix C, at C-1 to C-3.
97. See HINDERT ET AL., supra note 95, Appendix C, at C-4 to C-14.11.
98. Id
99. I& at §§ 1.02[1]-[3], and 1-6 to 1-13.
100. Id. at §§ 1.01[1], [2], and 1-2, 1-3.
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estate, especially considering that future medical costs often
constitute the greatest portion of the overall personal injury
award. This was the case in Suber.1° 1
Critics of periodic payment systems, however, question
departures from traditional monetary awards and voice con-
cern over speculation as to future damages. The plans also
raise potential issues of equal protection, undue jury burdens,
and the right to a jury trial. First, these periodic payment
schemes are attacked on grounds that they violate historic
common law principles favoring single lump sum monetary
judgments.10 2 Lump sum awards are based on the principle
that "a judgment must be certain in amount and unconditional
in effect."'1 3 This principle is based in turn on res judicata.' °
Although early rulings did not depend on the form of judg-
ment, both American and English courts have interpreted this
principle to require single monetary awards.0
A second criticism of periodic payments focuses on diffi-
culties in estimating what damages accrue over time.*°' Lump
sum estimates, however, may be no more inherently accurate
than periodic payment schemes.10 7
101. See supra notes 64, 65 and accompanying text. The foregoing is a general
introduction to periodic payment systems and structured settlements as a proposed
solution to risks of overcompensation and premature life support withdrawal in
instances of double litigation such as that in Suber. Exhaustive review of these
systems is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Flora, supra note 29;
HINDERT, supra note 95; the MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT, 14 U.L.A.
141 (1990).
102. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 533 (1983); Flora,
supra note 29, at 155-56, 158.
103. Flora, supra note 29, at 158 (citing U.S. v. Bauman, 56 F. Supp. 109, 117 (D.
Ore. 1943)).
104. HINDERT ET AL., supra note 95, § 1.02(1) at 1-6 (citing Fetter v. Beale, 1 Ld.
Raym. 339, 91 Eng. Rep. 11 (1699), aff'd, 1 Ld. Raym. 692, 91 Eng. Rep. 1122 (1702)).
105. Id.
106. "The determining factors by which future damages are actually awarded are
by their very nature things that cannot be known." Flora, supra note 29, at 180.
107. On the issue of lump sum estimates, one commentator has stated as follows:
The single recovery rule has been the object of criticism of bar and bench,
since it forces a jury or judge to lump into one sum what is, at best, an
educated guess of what will compensate a claimant for future damages. By
requiring the finder of fact to lump into one sum compensation for all past
and future actual and probable injury, the law has been accused of resorting
to 'haphazard methods of assessing compensation in actions for personal
injuries.'
HINDERT ET7 AL., supra note 95, § 1.02(1), at 1-7. Further, the Supreme Court has rea-
soned that "[o]ther courts have recognized that calculation of the loss sustained by
dependents or by the estate of the deceased, which is required under most present
wrongful-death statutes ... does not present difficulties more insurmountable than
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A third criticism of periodic payment schemes rests on
equal protection grounds. Critics allege that plaintiffs who are
forced to take personal injury awards in the form of periodic
payments are disadvantaged as compared to plantiffs bringing
other causes of action who benefit from the historical rule
favoring lump sum tort awards. 08 Yet these plans have passed
constitutional muster under rational basis review,1°' whereby
state interests in containing health costs were upheld against
an individual's right to recover a lump sum judgment. 110 Other
courts, however, hold that ordering periodic payments violates
a personal injury plaintiff's constitutional right to dispose of
property on the grounds that a judgment "becomes the plain-
tiff's property when obtained.""'
Critics argue that heightened judicial scrutiny should be
applied to these equal protection challenges to periodic pay-
ment schemes.112 Under this standard, payment provisions
would pass constitutional muster only if the state could show a
compelling or important state interest and a close nexus
between that interest and the means employed to advance it.
113
To date, no equal protection challenges to periodic pay-
ment systems have addressed the particular risks posed in
Suber-type cases, where dilemmas raised by advances in life
assessment of damages for many non-fatal personal injuries." Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 589, rehg denied, 415 U.S. 986 (1974) (citing Moragne v. State
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)).
108. See generally Flora, supra note 29, at 159-67.
109. Rational basis review connotes a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny in equal
protection challenges by which courts show the greatest deference to state legislative
enactments. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-65 (2d ed.
1991). Under this standard, the United States Supreme Court has required that
statutes be "reasonable, not arbitrary.... rest[ing] upon some ground... having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 541 (citing F. S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920)). The Court has also been satisfied by a "rational[ ]
relat[ionship] [of the proposed legislative means] to a legitimate state interest," and in
other cases has upheld statutes unless "the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." Id. (citing New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
respectively).
110. Flora, supra note 29, at 160-61 (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v.
Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984)).
111. Id. at 164 (citing Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980), in which the
New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned that its state statute unconstitutionally
burdened seriously injured malpractice victims with inordinate responsbility to combat
rising medical costs).
112. Id. at 180-81.
113. See STONE ET AL., supra note 109, at 541.
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support systems arguably reinforce states' interests. Those
interests may now also include controlling risks that survivors
might withdraw a victim's life support in order to create a
death upon which to sue, in addition to states' interests in com-
batting rising health care costs by controlling medical malprac-
tice premiums. These state interests (clearly advanced by
periodic payment systems) would likely withstand equal pro-
tection and due process challenges under even heightened judi-
cial scrutiny.
Critics further argue that periodic payment systems poten-
tially place unreasonable burdens on juries."4 Generally, peri-
odic payment statutes require juries to determine past
damages, future damages, and intervals over which future
damages are expected to accrue annually (segregating medical
costs as well as other economic and non-economic losses). 11
These are serious demands to make of juries, especially in view
of limited judicial resources and the social costs of prolonged
trials. But the importance of minimizing overcompensation
and preventing premature life support withdrawal arguably
justifies these burdens.
Finally, where statutes allow courts to fashion recovery
schedules once the juries have itemized damages, the argument
has been raised that periodic payments deny personal injury
victims the right to a jury trial.116 Where a jury arrives at a
total damages estimate, however, the integrity of that estimate
is not violated by a court's subsequent scheduling of payments.
Rather than substitute its own recovery figure for the jury's, a
court's application of a payment schedule only affects how the
award, as determined by the jury, will be distributed to recipi-
ents over time. Critics may assert that courts substitute their
114. Flora, supra note 29, at 178-79.
115. MODEL PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 4, 14 U.L.A. 141 (1990).
Further, "more detailed findings ... could be required because [of] ... periods of
maximum loss, periods of stabilized loss, requirements for one time medical
procedures or separate medical procedures at different points in the future." Id. § 4
cmt., at 16.
116. Flora, supra note 29, at 177. Washington's statute is one example. It provides
that a court or arbitrator shall, on the request of an interested party, enter a judgment
providing for periodic payment "in whole or in part." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.260
(1990). Critics argue that such provisions are unsound for two reasons. First, they
violate state constitutions that provide (as does Washington's) that "the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21. Second, they violate
common law rules that exclusively reserve determination of damages to juries. Flora,
supra note 29, at 177.
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own factual determinations for those of juries.117 But it may
be noted that courts have upheld statutes that place certain
determinations entirely outside the reach of juries (for exam-
ple, by stipulating present value reduction rates).118 Similarly,
courts should be able to set the amount and/or frequency of
periodic personal injury award payments independent of the
jury's autonomous determination of overall recovery.
In summary, fears of overcompensation of statutory bene-
ficiaries are misplaced in view of procedural, common law, and
statutory provisions that tailor recovery. The doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel and the use of special verdicts in personal
injury judgments protect against duplicative recovery in subse-
quent wrongful death proceedings. Periodic payment systems
further minimize risks of plaintiff windfalls by providing a
mechanism for recovery only for personal injuries experienced
and only as damages accrue. Where a court elects or mandates
periodic payment of a jury's award, no greater danger of specu-
lation necessarily exists than where a lump sum is awarded." 9
Also, the interests that these payment systems advance justify
additional burdens that they allegedly place on fact finders.
These payment plans are flexible enough to serve principles of
finality of judgment in that they do not prevent determination
of overall liability. They also withstand equal protection
challenges.
Finally, in addition to protecting against overcompensa-
tion, the use of periodic payment schemes greatly minimizes
the risk that beneficiaries will withdraw life support in order
to preserve a prior personal injury award otherwise designated
for future medical expenses. Where personal injury awards for
future medical needs are distributed only as those needs arise,
and where such payments terminate completely upon death,
no lump sum exists to trigger survivors' ill motives.
Thus, periodic payment systems promote statutory objec-
tives while protecting both injured victims and survivors.
120
117. Flora, supra note 29, at 178.
118. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 772 (Ill. 1986).
119. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
120. This Comment focuses primarily on periodic payments as particularly
responsive to problems raised by wrongful death actions in the context of advanced life
support systems. Other more generally applicable devices exist to minimize risks of
overcompensation of statutory beneficiaries. For example, damages ceilings can be
employed in these instances of double litigation as in the overall movement for tort
reform. Also, restricting classes of beneficiaries that could bring wrongful death
actions would restrict liability for damages. Under most statutes, beneficiaries include
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On balance, the use of these payment schemes promotes the
proper application of wrongful death acts by reducing the like-
lihood that actions will be improperly brought under these
statutes. This, in turn, protects and promotes the rights of sur-
vivors injured through the wrongful death of a family member.
C. Other Policy Concerns
One critic of the minority statutory construction of wrong-
ful death statutes argues that defendants, aware that an
independent right of recovery vests in wrongful death benefi-
ciaries despite a final personal injury judgment, will conse-
quently resist settling a personal injury claim in the hope that
the injured victim will die and that two theoretically possible
claims will regularly be reduced to only one (the wrongful
death action).121 This result disadvantages the injured victim
who seeks settlement. Such a strategy on the part of defend-
ants is frustrated, however, to the extent that the decedents'
representatives elect (via survival statutes) to litigate personal
injury actions after the death. Thus, theoretically, defendants
still must answer two independent claims.
Critics who concede that finality of judgments is not
threatened by periodic payment systems nevertheless suggest
that this threat persists where, because the class of wrongful
death beneficiaries does not close until death, that class might
expand significantly from the time a personal injury action is
concluded up to the time of the victim's death.122 Such class
expansion might occur upon the birth of heirs after the per-
sonal injury litigation, upon members subsequently reaching
majority, or upon intervening marriage.
1 23
spouses, natural or adoptive children, and sometimes parents. Dependency
requirements vary. Finally, excessive recovery can be minimized by restricting the
types of damages that wrongful death plaintiffs may seek; this argues in support of
limiting recovery to economic damages, but even this alternative would not entirely
withhold recovery as under the current majority statutory construction.
Exhaustive examination of the foregoing devices is beyond the scope of this
article. See generally Civiletti, supra note 15; Leonard J. Nelson, Tort Reform in
Alabama. Are Damages Restrictions Unconstitutional?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 533 (1989);
SPEISER, supra note 7, chs. 2-4, 10; Peter Biging, Note, Section 1983 Actions by Family
Members Based on Deprivation of the Constitutional Right to "Family Association"
Resulting from Wrongful Deatk Who Has Standing?, 14 FORDHAM L. REV. 441
(1986); Dale Katzenmeyer, Comment, Issues Complicating Rights of Spouses Parent.%
and Children to Sue for Wrongful Death, 19 AKRON L. REV. 419 (1986).
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Such class expansions might not arise in enough cases,
however, to justify imposing the majority construction of
wrongful death statutes and the wholesale denial of recovery
on behalf of statutory beneficiaries. Further, to the extent that
class expansions might significantly threaten finality in litiga-
tion, statutes can be amended to restrict classes of benefi-
ciaries. Such a restriction would limit uncertainty with respect
to possible future claimants and, thus, with respect to total lia-
bility as well. 24 Settlements that provide for continued peri-
odic payments to statutory beneficiaries beyond an injured
person's death can also fix the class at the time personal injury
settlements are struck.
Finally, majority rule advocates suggest that, although col-
lateral estoppel prevents duplicative compensation of wrongful
death beneficiaries, available means for tailoring recovery nev-
ertheless fail to prevent a personal injury recipient from wast-
ing portions of an award, to which survivors have a claim, upon
death. 5 This potential disadvantage to beneficiaries may,
however, be too speculative to outweigh the clear benefits con-
ferred on survivors in the form of an independent cause of
action for wrongful death following a final personal injury
judgment.
Wrongful death suits do not, therefore, significantly
threaten the settlement process, finality of judgments, or the
interests of statutory beneficiaries in such a way as to justify
withholding a cause of action from these plaintiffs.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS: APPLICATION TO SUBER
The foregoing solutions can be illustrated by hypothetical
application to the Suber case.126 To begin with, if the original
personal injury plaintiffs had sought a settlement on Ms.
Suber's behalf, because her right of action would have survived
her death, the defendant's resistance to settlement would have
been minimized given its hope of ultimately answering to only
one cause of action.
Next, a cause of action would have vested in the wrongful
death plaintiffs. That cause of action would have derived
directly from the defendant's negligent manufacture of its
anesthetic apparatus. This approach follows a minority con-
124. Id.
125. Id. at 392.
126. See supra part III.
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struction of the derivative language of Texas' wrongful death
statute," which closely tracks Lord Campbell's Act,' the
progenitor of most wrongful death statutes. The minority
interpretation accords most closely with Lord Campbell Act's
goal of creating a new and independent cause of action in the
decedent's survivors, and with its compensatory objectives.
Thus, when Ms. Suber died, her mother, husband, and children
would have been able to sue the defendant and, possibly, to
recover for their injuries.
Res judicata would have posed no obstacle to the wrongful
death action in Suber because different plaintiffs brought the
wrongful death action and, thus, sought different damages
than those awarded in Ms. Suber's prior personal injury suit.
Also, Ohio Medical's negligent conduct arguably gave rise to
two independent claims or causes of action: one addressing
personal injuries inflicted on Ms. Suber, and the other address-
ing injuries inflicted on her family by virtue of her wrongful
death. Accordingly, the subsequent wrongful death suit would
not constitute relitigation of the prior personal injury cause of
action. Nor would the defendant have been subjected to
double liability for a single wrong; by the foregoing rationale,
two independent wrongs existed. Res judicata would continue
to protect the defendant from relitigation of either cause of
action.
Collateral estoppel would also have assured that Ohio
Medical would not be subject to relitigation of liability, and
damages would have been limited to those not already awarded
in Ms. Suber's personal injury judgment. In this regard, dam-
ages sought in the wrongful death action for financial support
would have been precluded by the prior award of Ms. Suber's
lost future earnings. Similarly, recovery by the victim's hus-
band and children for loss of society could have been denied to
the extent that Ms. Suber's recovery for loss of consortium and
services included compensation for identical loss. Collateral
estoppel thus eliminates concerns for double recovery.
Further, as may be typical in a double litigation scenario,
no intervening expansion of the class of beneficiaries occurred
that would have raised uncertainty or posed risks of excessive
127. Suber v. Ohio Medical Prods., Inc., 811 S.W.2d 646, 653-54 (Tex. App.-
Houston 1991, writ denied). See TEx. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 71.003(a) (Vernon
1986).
128. Suber, 811 S.W.2d at 653-54. See Lord Campell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. ch. 93
(1846).
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liability so as to justify withholding recovery for wrongful
death. In any event, such risks are minimized by restricting
the statutory class and by addressing future contingencies in
the language of wrongful death legislation.
As to the court's fear of potential plaintiff windfalls by
way of Ms. Suber's estate, such fear would have been largely
allayed had Texas' judgment rules provided for periodic pay-
ments of the personal injury award. Because over eighty per-
cent of the $6,000,000 judgment was allocated to Ms. Suber's
future medical expenses throughout her then-projected life-
time, a periodic payment scheme would have applied to the
greatest portion of the total award and, therefore, would have
largely eliminated the risk of excessive compensation. That
risk, in any case, arises only where survivors actually do suc-
ceed to the decedent's estate by will or by intestacy. While sur-
vivors may succeed to the decedent's estate, they cannot
control this outcome; moreover, in some instances, a wrongful
death action represents survivors' only source of recovery,
even after a final personal injury judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
When a plaintiff concludes a suit on personal injuries that
later cause death, surviving wrongful death beneficiaries gen-
erally meet with a complete denial of recovery despite the very
real injuries that they have suffered through the loss of a rela-
tive. This inequity may become more commonplace as life sup-
port techniques increasingly prolong life well beyond final
judgments in personal injury suits. Fearing excessive recovery
by wrongful death beneficiaries, courts may continue to
respond with wholesale exclusion of damages, thus undermin-
ing the principles that produced wrongful death acts.
The underlying principles of wrongful death acts should
not be violated in order to solve modern litigation problems.
Instead, available statutory and common law devices should be
employed to better achieve the compensatory objectives upon
which wrongful death actions are based. Res judicata is not
involved in circumstances where both plaintiffs and damages
differ irrespective of personal injury and wrongful death
actions. Collateral estoppel can minimize risks of excessive
recovery without violating principles of res judicata and the
principles that underlie wrongful death actions. In addition,
special jury verdicts can further tailor recovery to reduce over-
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compensation. Importantly, periodic payment systems prevent
windfalls to wrongful death plaintiffs who might otherwise
accede to both a decedent's lump sum personal injury award
and to a wrongful death judgment. By awarding for certain
expenses only as they arise, such devices also protect against
the possible withdrawal of life support by beneficiaries seeking
to preserve a personal injury award or to create a death upon
which to sue.
The interests in properly construing wrongful death stat-
utes and in serving their compensatory objectives justifies the
burdens that might follow from reliance on collateral estoppel,
special verdicts, periodic payments, and other procedural and
legislative devices. Such devices, at least, help prevent con-
cerns for excessive recoveries from so "confound[ing] the statu-
tory rights of wrongful death beneficiaries as to wipe them out
completely."'' 1 9 In any event, if a justifiable public policy lies
in withholding recovery from wrongful death beneficiaries
when a decedent has already recovered from a final personal
injury judgment, then this policy is best implemented through
legislative, not judicial, amendment of existing statutes. Mean-
while, in departing from prevailing interpretations of wrongful
death acts, courts would more appropriately adapt to develop-
ing life support techniques and their complicating influence on
litigation.
129. Alfone v. Sarno, 432 A.2d 857, 866 (N.J. 1981).
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